People vs Mercado CASE DIGEST - ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE G.R. No. 218702, October 17, 2018

 

People vs Mercado, G.R. No. 218702, October 17, 2018

P: CAGUIOA, J.

FACTS: Evelyn Santos and Alicia Mercado are live in partners. Patrick Mercado, the nephew of Alicia was enrolled at the nearby STI College and used to live in the same house. At around 11PM Patrick was inside the house. Around 2AM the house was reported to be on fire. Evelyn and Patrick were brought out of the burning house. Evelyn looked weak and unable to walk as she was badly burnt. She also had blood oozing out of the right side of her head. Witnesses declared that as soon as Evelyn was carried out to safety, she promptly accused and pointed to Patrick as the person responsible for attacking her and Alicia as well as for setting the house on fire. Evelyn claimed that Patrick hit her and Alicia with a baseball bat then set them on fire. Witnesses heard this. While on board the ambulance, Evelyn repeated the name of Patrick as the culprit who caused their injuries and burned the house. Evelyn died at the Hospital. Based on the declarations of Evelyn, Patrick was charged for the killing of Evelyn and Alicia.

RTC found Patrick guilty of Double Murder. That although the evidence of the prosecution relied heavily on what appears to be hearsay evidence, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were still admissible because they were the dying declarations of Evelyn, and these were admissible under Sec. 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. That assuming that the testimonies were inadmissible under the rule on dying declaration, the same would nevertheless be admissible as it was part of the res gestae, allowed in evidence by virtue of Rule 130, Sec 42 of the Rules of Court. CA affirmed the RTC. CA ruled that Mercado's defense of denial anchored on the testimony of his neighbor that there was a bloodied man who came out of the house while it was on fire could not overcome the probative value of the dying declaration of Evelyn.

ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution was admissible under the rule on dying declaration or res gestae

HELD: YES. As an exception to the hearsay rule, a dying declaration is admissible as evidence because it is "evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation." Sec 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. For a "dying declaration" to be admissible in court, the following requisites must concur: a. That the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; b. That at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of an impending death; c. That the declarant is competent as a witness; and d. that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim.

The first and fourth requisites are undoubtedly present in this case. With regard to the third requisite, since there was no evidence presented to show that Evelyn could not have been competent to be a witness had she survived, the presumption that she would have been competent would be sustained. The third requisite is sufficiently met. The second requisite, Evelyn made the declarations just as she was pulled out of the fire, with blood coming out of her forehead, when she was having difficulty breathing, and with 2nd and 3rd degree burns affecting 74% of the total surface area of her body. Considering the foregoing facts – along with the principle enunciated in Umapas, the second requisite for a dying declaration is sufficiently met. Without doubt, therefore, the dying declarations of Evelyn to numerous witnesses are admissible in evidence.

In any event, even if the statements of Evelyn would not qualify as dying declarations, they are nevertheless admissible in evidence because they are part of the res gestae. Sec. 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.

Applying the foregoing to the present case, the statements of Evelyn were clearly part of the res gestae. The fire – which caused severe injuries on her body, destroyed her house, and killed her live-in partner – was undeniably a startling occurrence. Evelyn's statements were made immediately after she was rescued, and when she was clearly suffering from the pain caused by her injuries, thereby negating any possibility of her contriving or manufacturing a lie. The statements were also undoubtedly about the startling occurrence as Evelyn repeatedly claimed that Mercado was the one who attacked her and Alicia, and thereafter set the house on fire. The statements were thus certainly part of the res gestae.