DST MOVERS CO. vs. PEOPLE'S GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (PGIC), G.R. No.198627, January 13, 2016, RULE 130, Section 22. Testimony confined to personal knowledge.

 RULE 130, Section 22. Testimony confined to personal knowledge.

DST MOVERS CO. vs. PEOPLE'S GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (PGIC), G.R. No.198627, January 13, 2016

LEONEN, J.:

FACTS: A Honda Civic sedan owned by Fidel Yuboco was hit on the rear by an Isuzu Elf truck owned by DST Movers along the SLEX. PGIC underscored that the sedan was on a stop position when it was hit. The sedan was then allegedly pushed forward, hitting a Mitsubishi Lancer. The driver of the truck then allegedly escaped. The sedan was covered by PGIC’s insurance. As a result of the incident, the sedan’s owner filed a total loss claim with PGIC in the amount of P320k. PGIC paid. Asserting that it was subrogated to Yuboco’s rights and that the proximate cause of the mishap was the negligence of the driver of the truck, PGIC demanded from DST Movers the amount of P90k, which represented the difference between the P320k and the salvage price of P230k, at which PGIC was supposedly able to sell what remained of the sedan.  Its demands not having been satisfied, PGIC filed its Complaint for Sum of Money. In support of its recollection of the events, PGIC relied on a Traffic Accident Investigation Report (Report) prepared by PO2 Tomas of the Muntinlupa City Traffic Enforcement Unit of the PNP. DST Movers acknowledged that it was the owner of the truck. However, it claimed that the truck did not make any trips on that day as it was undergoing repairs and maintenance. DST Movers attached as copies of invoices, receipts, and cash vouchers relating to repairs and maintenance procedures that were undertaken on the truck on the day of the accident.

MTC found DST Movers liable. RTC and CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not DST Movers liability can be established based on the Traffic Accident Investigation Report

HELD: NO. Rule 130, Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. The Hearsay Rule, however, is not absolute. There are exceptions relevant to this case:  Sec. 44. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

This, however, is only true, for as long the following requisites have been satisfied: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.

Neither PO2 Tomas, nor the person who supposedly reported the events to PO2 Tomas gave a testimony in support of the Report. It was this person who reported and not PO2 Tomas, who had personal knowledge of the facts stated in the Report. Thus, even as the Report embodies entries made by a public officer in the performance of his duties, it fails to satisfy the third requisite for admissibility for entries in official records as an exception to the Hearsay Rule. To be admitted as evidence, it was thus imperative for PO2 Tomas to have himself presented as a witness and then testify on his Report. However, even as the Report would have been admitted as evidence, PO2 Tomas’ testimony would not have sufficed in establishing the identity of the motor vehicle and/or the person responsible for the damage sustained by the sedan. For this purpose, the testimony of G. Simbahon was necessary.