City of Manila v. Garcia, GR L-26053, 21 February 1967
FACTS: Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels
of land, forming one compact area in Malate, Manila, and covered by
Torrens Titles. Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947, defendants entered
upon these premises without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. They built
houses of second-class materials, again without plaintiff's knowledge and
consent,
There they lived thru the years to the present.
Few years thereafter, defendants were given written permits — each labeled "lease contract" — to occupy specific areas in the property upon conditions therein set forth. For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals.
Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not contiguous, to the property. Came the need for this school's expansion, plaintiff's City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive to clear squatters' houses on city property, gave each of defendants to vacate and remove his construction or improvement on the premises.
This was followed by the City Treasurer's demand on each defendant for the payment of the amount due by reason of the occupancy and to vacate. The city’s evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certification of the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board.
That document recites that the amount of P100,000.00 had been set aside in Ordinance 4566, the 1962–1963 Manila City Budget, for the construction of an additional building of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.
It is indeed correct to say that the court below, at the hearing, ruled out the admissibility of said document. But then, in the decision under review, the trial judge obviously revised his views. He there declared that there was need for defendants to vacate the premises for school expansion. He cited the very document, Exhibit E, aforesaid.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE COURT MAY TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF ORDINANCES?
HELD: YES. The charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board. Elimination of the certification, Exhibit E, as evidence, would not profit defendants. For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken—because he was duty bound to take— judicial notice of Ordinance 4566.
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