PEOPLE vs. CARLOS G.R. No. L-22948 March 17, 1925
FACTS: Dr. Sityar performed a surgical
operation upon the defendant's wife. After her release from the hospital she
was required to go several times to the clinic of Dr Sityar for the purpose of
dressing the wounds caused by the operation. On these occasions she was
accompanied by her husband, the defendant. The defendant states that on one of
the visits Sityar sent him out on an errand to buy some medicine, and that
while defendant was absent on this errand Sityar outraged the wife. The
defendant further states that his wife informed him of the outrage shortly
after leaving the clinic.
The defendant, without any preliminary
quarrel between the two, stabbed Sityar. The defendants made his escape but
surrendered himself in the evening of the following day. The defendant admits
that he killed the deceased but maintains that he did so in self-defense.
CFI found that the crime was committed
with premeditation and therefore constituted murder. This finding can only be
sustained by taking into consideration a letter written to the defendant by his
wife and siezed by the police in searching his effects on the day of his arrest.
It is dated two days before the commission of the crime and shows that the
writer feared that the defendant contemplated resorting to physical violence in
dealing with the deceased.
ISSUE: WON the letter may be deemed a
privileged communication, hence, not admissible as evidence.
HELD: YES. For documents of
communication coming into the possession of a third person, a
distinction should obtain, analogous to that already indicated for a client's
communications ; i. e., if they were obtained from the addressee by
voluntary delivery, they should still be privileged (for otherwise the
privilege could by collusion be practically nullified for written
communications); but if they were obtained surreptitiously or otherwise without
the addressee's consent, the privilege should cease.
The letter in question was obtained
through a search for which no warrant appears to have been issued and as
authority for the proposition that documents obtained by illegal searches of
the defendant's effects are not admissible in evidence in a criminal case.
The letter must, however, be excluded for
reasons not discussed in the briefs. The letter was written by the wife of the
defendant and if she had testified at the trial the letter might have been
admissible to impeach her testimony, but she was not put on the witness-stand
and the letter was therefore not offered for that purpose. If the defendant
either by answer or otherwise had indicated his assent to the statements
contained in the letter it might also have been admissible, but such is not the
case here; the fact that he had the letter in his possession is no indication
of acquiescence or assent on his part. The letter is therefore nothing but pure
hearsay and its admission in evidence violates the constitutional right of the
defendant in a criminal case to be confronted with the witnesses for the
prosecution and have the opportunity to cross-examine them. In this respect
there can be no difference between an ordinary communication and one originally
privileged.
The question is radically different from
that of the admissibility of testimony of a third party as to a conversation
between a husband and wife overheard by the witness. Testimony of that
character is admissible on the ground that it relates to a conversation in which
both spouses took part and on the further ground that where the defendant has
the opportunity to answer a statement made to him by his spouse and fails to do
so, his silence implies assent. That cannot apply where the statement is
contained in an unanswered letter.
Letter is excluded and not sufficient
evidence in the record to show that the crime was premeditated. Defendant is
guilty of simple homicide, without aggravating or extenuating circumstances. The
sentence is modified by reducing the penalty.
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