CIVIL PROCEDURE COA VS. PALER 614 SCRA

 COA VS. PALER  614 SCRA

Authority to file petition and sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping / appeal despite having been filed beyond the reglementary period

Facts: Celso M. Paler was a Supervising Legislative Staff Officer II with the Technical Support Service of the COA. Mr. Paner submitted a request for vacation leave for 74 working days then left for the U.S. without verifying whether the application for leave was approved. Comm. Chairman informed Paler that he was being dropped from the roll of employees due to his continuous 30-day absence without leave and in accordance with CSC Memorandum Circular No. 14, s. 1999. Mr. Paner moved for MR with the Comm. Chairman, was denied; on appeal, CSC reversed and set aside the Comm. Chairman's decision. (Rule 43) CA affirmed CSC resolution; hence Rule 45.

Issue/s:

1.          WON Commission Secretary may file the petition and sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in behalf of the Commission Chairman;

2. WON appeal may prosper despite having been filed beyond the reglementary period.

Ruling:

1.          Representatives, lawyers or any person who personally knew the truth of the facts alleged in the petition could sign the verification. However, as to the certification of non-forum shopping, the established rule is that it must be executed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by counsel. Lack of authority, (certification of non-forum shopping) dismissible.

2.          Procedural rules need not be strictly observed if appeal is meritorious. “it is within the power of this Court to temper rigid rules in favor of substantial justice. While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. If the rules are intended to ensure the orderly conduct of litigation, it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the protection of substantive rights of the parties.”

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE Verification and Certification MEDADO VS. HEIRS OF ANTONIO CONSUING

 MEDADO VS. HEIRS OF ANTONIO CONSUING

FACTS: (Spouses Medado) and Estate of Consing executed Deeds of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage of the property identified as Hacienda.

As part of the deal, Spouses Medado undertook to assume the estate's loan with (PNB). Subsequent to the sale, however, the Estate of Consing offered the subject lots to the government. Estate of Consing also instituted with the RTC, an action for rescission and damages against Spouses Medado due to the alleged failure of the spouses to meet the conditions in their agreement.

In the meantime while the case for rescission was pending, Land Bank issued in favor of the Estate of Consing a certificate of deposit of cash as compensation for the lots. Spouses Medado feared that LBP would release the full proceeds thereof to the Estate of Consing, they institute an action for injunction to restrain LBP from releasing the remaining amount of the proceeds of the lots to Estate of Consing, and restraining the Estate of Consing from receiving these proceeds

RTC granter the injunction (Medado) and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued. The writ was implemented 1 day before the hearing for the motion for reconsideration filed by Heirs of Consing. Feeling aggrieved, the heirs of the late Antonio Consing (Consing) questioned the RTC's order via a petition for certiorari filed with the CA. They sought, among other reliefs, the dismissal of the complaint for injunction for violation of the rules on litis pendentia and forum shopping.

On the matter of the absence of a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's order before resorting to a petition for certiorari, the heirs explained that the implementation of the questioned writs rendered their motion for reconsideration moot and academic. The heirs argued that their case was within the exceptions to the general rule that a petition under Rule 65 will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed.

CA NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE the ruling of RTC.

The CA ruled that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in taking cognizance of Civil Case for injunction during the pendency of Civil Case for rescission and damages as this violates the rule against forum shopping.

ISSUES: Whether or not the requirement for verification and certification against forum shopping complied with by the heris of consing when the same is solely signed by Soledad- administratix?

RULING: The requirements for verification and certification against forum shopping in the CA petition were substantially complied with, following settled jurisprudence. Where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a common interest in the property subject of the action, the fact that only one of the petitioners executed the verification or certification of forum shopping will not deter the court from proceeding with the action.

The Court has consistently held that verification of a pleading is a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement intended to secure the assurance that the matters alleged in a pleading are true and correct. Thus, the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules. It is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification; and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct. It was based on this principle that this Court had also allowed herein petitioner, via our Resolution dated April 22, 2009, a chance to submit a verification that complied with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, instead of the Court dismissing the petition outright.

CIVIL PROCEDURE Appeals Forum Shopping Fresh Period Rule Alma Jose vs. Javellana

 Alma Jose vs. Javellana

Facts: 1979, Alma (Margarita) sold 2 parcels of land for 160k. They agreed that Javellana would pay P80k upon the execution of the deed and the balance of P80k upon the registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens System and that should Margarita become incapacitated, her son Juvenal, and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla, would receive the payment of the balance and proceed with the application for registration.

Margarita died. Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking to register under the Torrens System, and, instead, began to improve the properties.

Javellana filed an action for specific performance, injunction, and damages against her in the RTC Malolos, Bulacan. Javellana prayed for the issuance of a TRO to restrain Priscilla from dumping filling materials in the parcels of land; and that Priscilla be ordered to institute registration proceedings and then to execute a final deed of sale in his favor.

RTC held that Javellana had no cause of action against her due to her not being bound to comply with the terms of the deed of conditional sale for not being party thereto.

The RTC held Javellana guilty of forum shopping. It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. CA dismissed the petition for certiorari. As to the notice on appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and remanded the records to the RTC.

Issue: WON Javellana was guilty of forum shopping

Held: No. Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause or supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.

Forum shopping happens when, in the two or more pending cases, there is identity of parties, identity of rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs sought. Where the elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other, there is forum shopping.

For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.

For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transaction, same essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not exist where different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought.

In his appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259, Javellana aimed to undo the RTC’s erroneous dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97 to clear the way for his judicial demand for specific performance to be tried and determined in due course by the RTC; but his petition for certiorari had the ostensible objective "to prevent (Priscilla) from developing the subject property and from proceeding with the ejectment case until his appeal is finally resolved," as the CA explicitly determined in its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455.

Nor were the dangers that the adoption of the judicial policy against forum shopping designed to prevent or to eliminate attendant. The first danger, i.e., the multiplicity of suits upon one and the same cause of action, would not materialize considering that the appeal was a continuity of Civil Case No. 79-M-97, whereas C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455 dealt with an independent ground of alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. The second danger, i.e., the unethical malpractice of shopping for a friendly court or judge to ensure a favorable ruling or judgment after not getting it in the appeal, would not arise because the CA had not yet decided C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259 as of the filing of the petition for certiorari.

CIVIL PROCEDURE Modes of Appeal Heirs of Arturo Garcia (In Substitution Of Heirs Of Melecio Bueno) vs Municipality of Iba

 Heirs of Arturo Garcia (In Substitution Of Heirs Of Melecio Bueno) vs Municipality of Iba

Bueno was the beneficiary of an agricultural land in Zambales. He brought an ejectment suit in the MTC against the Municipality claiming that it had constructed the public market on a portion of his land without his consent; and that his repeated demands for it to vacate the property had remained unheeded.

MTC ruled in favor of Bueno.  Municipality filed its notice of appeal, but the MTC denied. Thus, the Municipality filed its petition for certiorari in the RTC to assail the denial of due course by the MTC. RTC granted the petition for certiorari. 

The petitioners substituted Bueno upon his death, moved for the reconsideration of the judgment granting the petition for certiorari, but the RTC denied their motion for reconsideration. They appealed to the CA by petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.

CA "dismissed" the petitioners' petition for review for not being the proper mode of appeal, observing that the assailed orders had been issued by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. MR was denied

I: WON the petition for review was not the proper mode of appeal

YES. An appeal brings up for review any error of judgment committed by a court with jurisdiction over the subject of the suit and over the persons of the parties, or any error committed by the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction amounting to nothing more than an error of judgment. In section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court

Section 2.Modes of appeal.

(a) Ordinary appeal.- The appeal to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.

(b) Petition for review.- The appeal to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.

(c) Appeal by certiorari.-In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the SC by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45

The filing of the notice of appeal sets in motion the remedy of ordinary appeal because the appeal is deemed perfected as to the appealing party upon his timely filing of the notice of appeal. It is upon the perfection of the appeal filed in due time, and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties that the RTC shall lose jurisdiction over the case. The compliance with these requirements was the only way by which they could have perfected their appeal from the adverse judgment of the RTC.

In contrast, an appeal filed under Rule 42 is deemed perfected as to the petitioner upon the timely filing of the petition for review before the CA, while the RTC shall lose jurisdiction upon perfection thereof and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. 

The appeal by notice of appeal under Rule 41 is a matter or right, but the appeal by petition for review under Rule 42 is a matter of discretion. An appeal as a matter of right, which refers to the right to seek the review by a superior court of the judgment rendered by the trial court, exists after the trial in the first instance. In contrast, the discretionary appeal, which is taken from the decision or final order rendered by a court in the exercise of its primary appellate jurisdiction, may be disallowed by the superior court in its discretion. The CA has the discretion whether to due course to the petition for review or not. 

The procedure taken after the perfection of an appeal under Rule 41 also significantly differs from that taken under Rule 42. Under Section 10 of Rule 41, the clerk of court of the RTC is burdened to immediately undertake the transmittal of the records by verifying the correctness and completeness of the records of the case; the transmittal to the CA must be made within 30 days from the perfection of the appeal. ¹⁸ This requirement of transmittal of the records does not arise under Rule 42, except upon order of the CA when deemed necessary. ¹⁹

As borne out in the foregoing, the petitioners' resort to the petition for review under Rule 42 was wrong. Hence, the CA did not err in denying due course to the petition for review. CA IS AFFIRMED.

CIVIL PROCEDURE Newly Discovered Evidence Chua vs. People

 Chua vs. People

Chua issued several postdated checks to See. Checks were dishonored either due to insufficient funds or closed account. Despite demands, Chua failed to make good the checks. Hence, See filed a Complaint for violations of 54 counts of BP 22 in MTC.

Chua argues that the presumption that the issuer had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds only arises after it is proved that the issuer actually received a notice of dishonor and within 5 days from receipt thereof failed to pay the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment. OSG avers that Chua’s contention involves a factual issue which is not within the province of a certiorari petition. OSG: that the MTC, RTC and the CA all considered the said document as a newly discovered evidence.

Several years later, See just found the demand letter. The prosecution thus prayed that it be allowed to submit a supplemental offer of evidence to include said demand letter. MTC convicted Chua of 54 counts of violation of BP 22 after it found all the elements of the offense obtaining in the case. RTC and CA affirmed MTC. Hence, Petition for Review on Certiorari.

I: WON the demand letter shall be considered as a newly discovered evidence.

No. The issues raised by Chua involve questions of law. Nevertheless, assuming that the questions posed before this Court are indeed factual, the rule that factual findings of the lower courts are not proper subject of certiorari petition admits of exceptions. One of these exceptions is when the lower courts failed to appreciate certain facts and circumstances which, if taken into account, would materially affect the result of the case. The Court finds the said exception applicable in the instant case. Clearly, the petition deserves the consideration of this Court. The prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the offenses charged.

At any rate, the demand letter dated deserves no weight not only because it does not qualify as a newly discovered evidence within the purview of the law but also because of its doubtful character. The movant for a new trial must not only act in a timely fashion in gathering evidence in support of the motion; he must act reasonably and in good faith as well. Due diligence contemplates that the defendant acts reasonably and in good faith to obtain the evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances and the facts known to him.⁴³

"Under the Rules of Court, the requisites for newly discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment."⁴⁴

In this case, the Court holds that the demand letter does not qualify as a newly discovered evidence. Per See’s statements in his affidavit, the said evidence was already known to him at the time he filed his complaint against Chua. It was also apparently available considering that it was just kept in his house. Undeniably, had See exercised reasonable diligence, he could have promptly located the said demand letter and presented it during trial. However, the circumstances suggest otherwise.

Chua’s acquittal, however, does not entail the extinguishment of his civil liability for the dishonored checks. Chua is acquitted.

CIVIL PROCEDURE New Trial Mendezona vs.Ozamis

 Mendezona vs.Ozamis

F: A suit for quieting of title was filed by Mendezona alleging they own land in Cebu. Their titles was executed by Ozamiz. Thereafter, there is an inscription in the title of notice of lis pendens, there is a proceeding for guardianship over the person and properties of Ozamiz. Ozamiz (Montalvan) alleged that the titles issued in the petitioners names are defective and illegal.

Trial on the merits ensued Mendezona testified on the circumstances surrounding the sale and the notary public who notarized the said document. Defendants: the testimonies of a sister, assistant, helper, appraiser of land, doctor  etc. of Ozamiz.

RTC in favor of Mendezona. CA reversed.

Petitioners filed a MR and subsequently a motion for a new trial and/or for reception of evidence. That CA ignored the testimony of the Judge regarding the mental condition of Ozamiz a month before the execution of the Sale in question. However, Judge was not presented as a witness. That Judge’s testimony is a newly-discovered evidence which could not have been discovered prior to the trial in the court below by the exercise of due diligence. CA DENIED.

I: WON there should be a new trial

A motion for new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence is properly granted only where there is concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (a) the evidence had been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not have been discovered and produced during trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material and not merely corroborative, cumulative or impeaching and is of such weight that if admitted, would probably alter the result. All three (3) requisites must characterize the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial.

Here, the requirement of reasonable diligence has not been met by the petitioners. As early as the pre-trial of the case at bar, the name of Judge  has already cropped up as a possible witness for the defendants. That the respondents chose not to present him is not suppression of evidence. Neither can Judge’s testimony in another case be considered as newly discovered evidence since the facts to be testified were existing before and during the trial, could have been presented by the petitioners at the trial below. RTC DECISION IS REINSTATED.

TAXATION Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Municipality of Victorias, L-21183, September 27, 1968

 Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Municipality of Victorias,  L-21183, September 27, 1968 

FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the July 27, 1984 Decision of the Office of the Presidential Assistant For Legal Affairs dismissing the appeal from the adverse ruling of the Philippine Ports Authority on the sole ground that the same was filed beyond the reglementary period.

On April 28, 1981, the Iloilo Port Manager of respondent Philippine Ports Authority (PPA for short) wrote petitioner Victorias Milling Co., requiring it to have its tugboats and barges undergo harbor formalities and pay entrance/clearance fees as well as berthing fees effective May 1, 1981. PPA, likewise, requiring petitioner to secure a permit for cargo handling operations at its Da-an Banua wharf and remit 10% of its gross income for said operations as the government's share.

Victorias Milling Co. maintained that it is except from paying PPA any fee or charge because: 1. The wharf and its facilities are built and installed on it’s own land; 2. Repairs and maintenance are solely paid by it; 3. Maintenance and dredging of the channel are done by the Company personnel; 4. At not time has the government paid any centavo for such activities.

ISSUE: WON the Victorias Milling Co. claim of exception for PPA fees is meritorious.

HELD: No, the petitioners claim that there is no basis for the PPA to assess and impose the dues and charge is devoid of merit.

As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the fees and charges PPA collects are not for the use of the wharf that petitioner owns but for the privilege of navigating in public waters, of entering and leaving public harbours and berthing on public streams or waters.

As to the requirement to remit 10% of the handling charges, Section 6B-(ix) of the Presidential Decree No. 857 authorized the PPA "To levy dues, rates, or charges for the use of the premises, works, appliances, facilities, or for services provided by or belonging to the Authority, or any organization concerned with port operations." This 10% government share of earnings of arrastre and stevedoring operators is in the nature of contractual compensation to which a person desiring to operate arrastre service must agree as a condition to the grant of the permit to operate.

TAXATION NPC vs. City of Cabanatuan GR No. 149110, April 9, 2003

 NPC vs. City of Cabanatuan GR No. 149110, April 9, 2003 

TAXATION: The most effective means to raise revenues; LGU's Power of Taxation, exception to Non-delegation of taxing power; Tax Exemptions, construed strongly against the claimant

Facts: NPC, a GOCC, created under CA 120 as amended, selling electric power, was assessed by the City of Cabanatuan for franchise tax pursuant to sec. 37 of Ordinance No. 165-92. NPC refused to pay the tax assessment on the grounds that the City of Cabanatuan has no authority to impose tax on government entities and also that it is exempted as a non-profit organization. For its part, the City government alleged that NPC’s exemption from local taxes has been repealed by sec. 193 of RA 7160.

Issue: Whether NPC is liable to pay an annual franchise tax to the City government

Held: Although as a general rule, LGUs cannot impose taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, this rule now admits an exception, i.e., when specific provisions of the LGC authorize the LGUs to impose taxes, fees or charges on the aforementioned entities.

A franchise tax is "a tax on the privilege of transacting business in the state and exercising corporate franchises granted by the state." It is not levied on the corporation simply for existing as a corporation, upon its property or its income, but on its exercise of the rights or privileges granted to it by the government. Hence, a corporation need not pay franchise tax from the time it ceased to do business and exercise its franchise.

It is within this context that the phrase "tax on businesses enjoying a franchise" in section 137 of the LGC determine whether the petitioner is covered by the franchise tax in question, the following requisites should concur: (1) that petitioner has a "franchise" in the sense of a secondary or special franchise; and (2) that it is exercising its rights or privileges under this franchise within the territory of the respondent city government.

NPC fulfills both requisites. 

As a rule, tax exemptions are construed strongly against the claimant. Exemptions must be shown to exist clearly and categorically, and supported by clear legal provisions. In the case at bar, the petitioner's sole refuge is section 13 of Rep. Act No. 6395 exempting from, among others, "all income taxes, franchise taxes and realty taxes to be paid to the National Government, its provinces, cities, municipalities and other government agencies and instrumentalities."

It is worth mentioning that section 192 of the LGC empowers the LGUs, through ordinances duly approved, to grant tax exemptions, initiatives or reliefs.77 But in enacting section 37 of Ordinance No. 165-92 which imposes an annual franchise tax "notwithstanding any exemption granted by law or other special law," the respondent city government clearly did not intend to exempt the petitioner from the coverage thereof.

Doubtless, the power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues to finance and support myriad activities of the local government units for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. As this Court observed in the Mactan case, "the original reasons for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted to government-owned or controlled corporations and all other units of government were that such privilege resulted in serious tax base erosion and distortions in the tax treatment of similarly situated enterprises." With the added burden of devolution, it is even more imperative for government entities to share in the requirements of development, fiscal or otherwise, by paying taxes or other charges due from them.

TAXATION Manila Electric Company vs. Province of Laguna, GR No. 131359, May 5, 1999

   Manila Electric Company vs. Province of Laguna, GR No. 131359, May 5, 1999

FACTS: Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) was granted franchise by certain municipalities  of the Province of Laguna and the National Electrification Administration for the supply of electric light, heat and power within their concerned areas.

Upon enactment of the Local Government Code, the province enacted an ordinance imposing a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise. MERALCO paid under protest and later claimed for refund as it contravened Sec 1 of PD 551 imposing a franchise tax of 2% of gross receipts notwithstanding any provision of law or local ordinance to the contrary.

ISSUE:WON the imposition of a franchise tax by the Province of Laguna to MERALCO is violative of the non impairment clause of the Constitution considering that under PD 551 notwithstanding  any provision of law or local ordinance to the contrary, the franchise tax payable shall be 2% of gross receipts.

HELD: No, it is contractual tax exemptions where non impairment clause of the Constitution can rightly be invoked, not franchise.  Contractual tax exemptions are those agreed to by the taxing authority in contracts, such as those contained in government bonds or debentures, lawfully entered into by them under enabling laws in which the government, acting in its private capacity, sheds its cloak of authority and waives its governmental immunity.

It is even explicit in Article XII, Section 11, of the 1987 Constitution that “…Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. ” Hence, the Local Government Code repealed or modified the inconsistent part or parts of PD 551.

LABOR LAW Genpact Services, Inc. vs. SANTOSFALCESO ET AL G.R. No. 227695, July 31, 2017

Genpact Services, Inc. vs. SANTOSFALCESO ET AL G.R. No. 227695, July 31, 2017

 Ponente: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Doctrine: The remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration may be availed of once by each party. Where only respondents had filed a motion for reconsideration before the NLRC, petitioners also had an opportunity to file such motion in this case, should they wish to do so.

FACTS: Genpact hired Santos-Falceso et al. to service its Allstate account. However, Allstate ended its account with Genpact resulting in respondents being placed on floating status, and eventually, terminated from service. Respondents to file a complaint before the NLRC for illegal dismissal.

Genpact justified the termination on the ground of cessation of Allstate's account. That they provide respondents with the option to either resign or be separated. They were properly given separation pay, as well as unpaid allowances and 13th month pay, thus, rendering the latter's monetary claims bereft of merit.

LA found the termination was due to the untimely cessation of the operations of Allstate. Genpact tried to remedy the situation but such efforts proved futile as they were hired specifically to match the needs of Allstate. Payment of separation pay was a sign of good faith. Thus, there was an authorized cause in the termination, and that Gen pact complied with DOLE's requirements. NLRC partly granted respondents and increased respondents' entitlement to separation pay. CA dismissed purely on procedural grounds. Petitioners' failure to file a MR before the NLRC prior to elevating the case to the CA is a fatal infirmity which rendered their petition for certiorari dismissible.

ISSUE: WON the CA correctly dismissed outright the certiorari petition filed by petitioners before it on procedural grounds.

HELD: YES. The general rule under Rule 65 is that a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to certiorari, since a motion for reconsideration may still be considered. Exceptions: (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; Exceptions in items d and e are present in this case.

The dispositive portion of the NLRC which partially granted respondents' motion explicitly warns the litigating parties that the NLRC shall no longer entertain any further motions for reconsideration. This gave petitioners the impression that moving for reconsideration before the NLRC would only be an exercise in futility in light of the tribunal's aforesaid warning.

Under Sec. 15, Rule VII of NLRC Rules of Procedure provides that the remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration may be availed of once by each party. In this case, only respondents had filed a motion for reconsideration before the NLRC. Applying the foregoing provision, petitioners also had an opportunity to file such motion in this case, should they wish to do so. However, the tenor of such warning effectively deprived petitioners of such opportunity, thus, constituting a violation of their right to due process.

Petitioners were completely justified in pursuing a direct recourse to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Decision of CA is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant case is REMANDED to the CA for a resolution on the merits.

TAXATION Fishwealth Canning Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 610 SCRA 524, G.R. No. 179343. January 21, 2010

Fishwealth Canning Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 610 SCRA 524, G.R. No. 179343. January 21, 2010

Facts: The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (respondent), by Letter of Authority dated May 16, 2000, ordered the examination of the internal revenue taxes for the taxable year 1999 of Fishwealth Canning Corp. (petitioner).  The investigation disclosed that petitioner was liable in the amount of P2,395,826.88 representing income tax, value added tax (VAT), withholding tax deficiencies and other miscellaneous deficiencies.  Petitioner eventually settled these obligations onAugust 30, 2000.

          On August 25, 2000, respondent reinvestigated petitioner’s books of accounts and other records of internal revenue taxes covering the same period for the purpose of which it issued a subpoena duces tecum requiring petitioner to submit its records and books of accounts.  Petitioner requested the cancellation of the subpoena on the ground that the same set of documents had previously been examined. 

Respondent sent, on August 6, 2003, petitioner a  Final Assessment Notice of income tax and VAT deficiencies totaling P67,597,336.75 for the taxable year 1999, which assessment petitioner contested by letter of September 23, 2003.

Respondent thereafter issued a Final Decision on Disputed Assessment dated August 2, 2005, which petitioner received on August 4, 2005, denying its letter of protest, and requesting the immediate payment thereof, “inclusive of penalties incident to delinquency.” Respondent added that if petitioner disagreed, it may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) “within thirty (30) days from date of receipt hereof, otherwise our said deficiency income and value-added taxes assessments shall become final, executory, and demandable.” Instead of appealing to the CTA, petitioner filed, on September 1, 2005, a Letter of Reconsideration dated August 31, 2005.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. The Resolution denying its motion for reconsideration was received by petitioner on October 31, 2006.

On November 21, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for review before the CTA En Banc which, by Decision  of July 5, 2007, held that the petition before the First Division, as well as that before it, was filed out of time.

Issue: WON CTA En Banc erred in holding that the petition it filed before the CTA First Division as well as that filed before it (CTA En Banc) was filed out of time. 

Held: The Court dismissed the petition. In the case at bar, petitioner’s administrative protest was denied by Final Decision on Disputed Assessment dated August 2, 2005 issued by respondent and which petitioner received on August 4, 2005.  Under the above-quoted Section 228 of the 1997 Tax Code, petitioner had 30 days to appeal respondent’s denial of its protest to the CTA. 

Since petitioner received the denial of its administrative protest on August 4, 2005, it had until September 3, 2005 to file a petition for review before the CTA Division.  It filed one, however, on October 20, 2005, hence, it was filed out of time.  For a motion for reconsideration of the denial of the administrative protest does not toll the 30-day period to appeal to the CTA.

TAXATION CIR vs. Rhombus Energy Incorporated (CTA EB Case No. 803, October 11, 2012)

 CIR vs. Rhombus Energy Incorporated (CTA EB Case No. 803, October 11, 2012)

Facts: Rhombus filed an Annual ITR for taxable year 2005, respondent indicated that its excess creditable withholding tax ("CWT") for the year 2005 was "To be refunded". On May 29, 2006, respondent filed its Quarterly Income Tax Return for the first quarter of taxable year 2006 showing prior year's excess credits ofP1,500,653.00.

On August 25, 2006, respondent filed its Quarterly Income Tax Return for the second quarter of taxable year 2006 showing prior year's excess credits ofP1,500,653.00.

On November 27, 2006, respondent filed its Quarterly Income Tax Return for the third quarter of taxable year 2006 showing prior year's excess credits ofP1,500,653.00.

On December 29, 2006, respondent filed with the Revenue Region No. 8 an administrative claim for refund of its alleged excess/unutilized CWT for the year 2005 in the amount ofP1,500,653.00.

Respondent filed its Annual Income Tax Return for taxable year 2006 showing prior year's excess credits of PO.OO. Pending petitioner's action on respondent's claim for refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate of its excess/unutilized CWT for the year 2005 and before the lapse of the period for filing an appeal, respondent filed the instant Petition for Review.

Issues: 1. WON RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO ITS CLAIM FOR REFUND OF UNUTILIZED CREDIT ABLE WITHHOLDING T AXES IN THE AMOUNT OF P1,500,653.00, FOR TAXABLE YEAR 2005.

2. WON RESPONDENT HAD ALREADY EXERCISED ITS OPTION TO CARRY-OVER ITS CLAIM FOR REFUND OF UNUTILIZED CREDIT ABLE WITHHOLDING TAXES

Held: Section 76 gives two options to a taxable corporation whose total quarterly income tax payment in a given taxable year exceeds its total income tax due. These options are (1) be credited or refunded either in the form of cash or credit certificate with the excess amount paid; or (2) carry over the excess credit to the succeeding taxable year.

The first option works simply by applying for a cash refund or tax credit certificate with the BIR for any tax on income that is paid in excess of the amount due to the government. The second option, on the other hand, works by applying the refundable amount, as shown on the Final Adjustment Return, of the given taxable year, against the income tax liabilities of the succeeding taxable year.

Since petitioner incurred a net loss for taxable year 2005, on December 29, 2006, petitioner filed with Revenue Region 8 an administrative claim for refund of its excess creditable withholding tax for calendar year 2005 in the amount of P1,500,653.00 (Exhibit "!"). In effect, petitioner availed o f the first option provided in Section 76 o f the NIRC of1997, as amended.

However, a perusal of petitioner's Quarterly Income Tax Return for the first quarter of taxable year 2006 (Exhibit "DD'') shows that petitioner carried over its unutilized creditable withholding tax for taxable year 2005 in the amount ofP1,500,653.00, subject of the present petition for refund or issuance of a TCC.

Also, a perusal of petitioner’s Quarterly Income Tax Return for the second quarter of taxable year 2006 (Exhibit "EE'') shows that petitioner again carried over its unutilized creditable withholding tax for taxable year 2005 in the amount ofP1,500,653.00, subject of the present petition for refund or issuance of a TCC.

Likewise, petitioner's Quarterly Income Tax Return for the third quarter of taxable year 2006 (Exhibit "FF") shows that petitioner carried over its unutilized creditable withholding tax for taxable year 2005 in the amount of Pl,500,653.00, subject of the present petition for refund or issuance ofa TCC.

It bears stressing that the last paragraph of Section 76 of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, provides that once the option to carry-over and apply the excess quarterly income tax against income due for the taxable quarters of the succeeding taxable years has been made, such option shall be considered irrevocable for that taxable period and no application for cash refund or issuance o f a TCC shall be allowed therefore.

CIVIL PROCEDURE Petition for Certiorari Motion for extension ADTEL, INC. and/or CASAS vs. VALDEZ, G.R. No. 189942, August 9, 2017

 ADTEL, INC. and/or CASAS vs. VALDEZ, G.R. No. 189942, August 9, 2017

Ponente: Carpio, J.

Doctrine: Petitions for certiorari must be filed within 60 days from the notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. However, it is not absolute. A motion for extension was allowed in petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 subject to the Court's sound discretion and only under exceptional or meritorious cases.

FACTS: Adtel hired Valdez to work as an accountant. Valdez was promoted as purchasing and logistics supervisor. Adtel then entered into a dealership agreement for 12 months with respondent's husband. Mr. Valdez filed a civil case against Adtel for specific performance and damages for the execution of the terms of the dealership agreement. He also instituted a criminal complaint for libel against Adtel's chairman, president, and officers. Adtel directing respondent to show cause why she should not be terminated for conflict of interest and/or serious breach of trust and confidence since respondent had access to vital information that can be used against Adtel. Respondent was suspended and eventually, terminated. Valdez filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with LA. She alleged that she did not violate any company rule or policy; neither was she guilty of fraud, nor willful breach of trust. That she was illegally dismissed without just cause and was entitled to separation pay, backwages, and damages.

LA dismissed and found that there existed a conflict of interest between respondent and Adtel. That respondent was a managerial employee with a fiduciary duty to protect the interest of Adtel. The civil and criminal cases initiated by respondent's husband indubitably created a conflict of interest that was a just cause for her dismissal by Adtel.

NLRC reversed LA. Adtel illegally dismissed respondent. Adtel failed to substantially prove the existence of an act or omission personally attributable to the respondent to serve as a just cause to terminate her employment. CA denied the motion for extension and dismissed Adtel's petition for certiorari for being filed beyond the reglementary period.

ISSUE: WON CA committed an error in denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration and in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the sole basis of technicality.

HELD: Petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from the notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. It was non-extendible and the CA no longer had the authority to grant the motion for extension. However, it is not absolute. A motion for extension was allowed in petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 subject to the Court's sound discretion and only under exceptional or meritorious cases.

Adtel's motion for extension was due to their counsel's heavy volume of work. However, a heavy workload alone, absent a compelling or special reason, is not a sufficient justification to allow an extension. It is ought to be coupled with more compelling reasons such as illness of counsel or other emergencies that could be substantiated by affidavits of merit.

CA is affirmed.

EVIDENCE Privileged Communication PEOPLE vs. CARLOS G.R. No. L-22948 March 17, 1925

 PEOPLE vs. CARLOS G.R. No. L-22948 March 17, 1925

FACTS: Dr. Sityar performed a surgical operation upon the defendant's wife. After her release from the hospital she was required to go several times to the clinic of Dr Sityar for the purpose of dressing the wounds caused by the operation. On these occasions she was accompanied by her husband, the defendant. The defendant states that on one of the visits Sityar sent him out on an errand to buy some medicine, and that while defendant was absent on this errand Sityar outraged the wife. The defendant further states that his wife informed him of the outrage shortly after leaving the clinic.

The defendant, without any preliminary quarrel between the two, stabbed Sityar. The defendants made his escape but surrendered himself in the evening of the following day. The defendant admits that he killed the deceased but maintains that he did so in self-defense.

CFI found that the crime was committed with premeditation and therefore constituted murder. This finding can only be sustained by taking into consideration a letter written to the defendant by his wife and siezed by the police in searching his effects on the day of his arrest. It is dated two days before the commission of the crime and shows that the writer feared that the defendant contemplated resorting to physical violence in dealing with the deceased.

ISSUE: WON the letter may be deemed a privileged communication, hence, not admissible as evidence.

HELD: YES. For documents of communication coming into the possession of a third person, a distinction should obtain, analogous to that already indicated for a client's communications ; i. e., if they were obtained from the addressee by voluntary delivery, they should still be privileged (for otherwise the privilege could by collusion be practically nullified for written communications); but if they were obtained surreptitiously or otherwise without the addressee's consent, the privilege should cease.

The letter in question was obtained through a search for which no warrant appears to have been issued and as authority for the proposition that documents obtained by illegal searches of the defendant's effects are not admissible in evidence in a criminal case.

The letter must, however, be excluded for reasons not discussed in the briefs. The letter was written by the wife of the defendant and if she had testified at the trial the letter might have been admissible to impeach her testimony, but she was not put on the witness-stand and the letter was therefore not offered for that purpose. If the defendant either by answer or otherwise had indicated his assent to the statements contained in the letter it might also have been admissible, but such is not the case here; the fact that he had the letter in his possession is no indication of acquiescence or assent on his part. The letter is therefore nothing but pure hearsay and its admission in evidence violates the constitutional right of the defendant in a criminal case to be confronted with the witnesses for the prosecution and have the opportunity to cross-examine them. In this respect there can be no difference between an ordinary communication and one originally privileged.

The question is radically different from that of the admissibility of testimony of a third party as to a conversation between a husband and wife overheard by the witness. Testimony of that character is admissible on the ground that it relates to a conversation in which both spouses took part and on the further ground that where the defendant has the opportunity to answer a statement made to him by his spouse and fails to do so, his silence implies assent. That cannot apply where the statement is contained in an unanswered letter.

Letter is excluded and not sufficient evidence in the record to show that the crime was premeditated. Defendant is guilty of simple homicide, without aggravating or extenuating circumstances. The sentence is modified by reducing the penalty.

EVIDENCE Best Evidence Rule 2 Hutchison v. Buscas, GR 158554, 26 May 2005

 Hutchison v. Buscas, GR 158554, 26 May 2005

FACTS: The spouses purchased a land. They occupied the land after a title was issued in their names. Arrastia, the owner of a lot adjacent, sold a portion of her land to Buscas which was evidenced by a Quitclaim Deed in favor of Buscas. Buscas occupied his land but he failed to register the portion of the lot in his name and title to the property remained in Arrastia’s name.

A geodetic engineer surveyed his property which revealed that some land was occupied by spouses. Spouses refused to vacate. Respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer. MTC ruled in favor of respondent. RTC dismissed the case. It ruled that MTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter as it is a boundary dispute and the proper action should have been an accion reinvindicatoria before the RTC.

A case for accion reinvindicatoria was filed against petitioner. At the trial, respondent adduced in evidence the Quitclaim Deed to prove his title over the disputed area. He likewise testified on the survey conducted by the geodetic engineer. Another geodetic engineer, Nicdao, in compliance with the order of MTC, he surveyed the 2 lots using the title of the spouses and the records of the Bureau of Lands.² His survey revealed that petitioner spouses encroached on the adjacent land. Respondent offered in evidence the verification plan and report of Nicdao relative to his survey.

RTC ruled that respondent’s Quitclaim Deed was not sufficient proof of ownership; that respondent failed to clearly identify the property claimed as it was only marked with an "X" sign, and; that petitioner spouses, as registered owners, are entitled to possession of the disputed lot.

CA reversed the decision of RTC. It ruled that respondent is entitled to possession of the disputed area as he was able to prove his claim of ownership and the identity of the subject land.

ISSUE: WON the Quitclaim deed sufficient to prove Buscas ownership of the disputed area

HELD: NO.  The Quitclaim Deed specified only the extent of the area sold. Annex "A" of the Deed, where the entire lot of Arrastia was particularly described and where the specific portion of the property sold to respondent was marked, was not presented by respondent at the trial. As the Deed itself failed to mention the metes and bounds of the land subject of the sale, it cannot be successfully used by respondent to identify the area he was claiming and prove his ownership thereof. Indeed, the presentation of the Annex "A" is essential as what defines a piece of land is not the size mentioned in the instrument but the boundaries thereof which enclose the land and indicate its exact limits.¹⁰

Neither can the surveys of the lots of petitioner spouses and respondent prove the identity of the contested area and respondent’s ownership thereof. The records show that when geodetic engineers Manansala and Nicdao surveyed the lands, they merely relied on the self-serving statement of respondent that he owns the portion of the lot adjacent to petitioner spouses. They were not shown the Deed of Quitclaim and its Annex "A" or any other document of title which described the specific portion of the land allegedly conveyed to respondent.¹¹ Thus, the surveys cannot be given evidentiary weight to prove the identity of the land sold to respondent and his ownership thereof.

The rules on evidence provide that where the contents of the document are the facts in issue, the best evidence is the instrument itself. In the case at bar, the identity of the land claimed and respondent’s ownership thereof are the very facts in issue. The best evidence to prove these facts is the Quitclaim Deed and its Annex "A" where respondent derives his title and where the land from which he purchased a part was described with particularity, indicating the metes and bounds thereof. Respondent’s failure to adduce in evidence Annex "A" of the Quitclaim Deed or produce secondary evidence, after proof of its loss, destruction or unavailability, is fatal to his cause.

EVIDENCE Secondary Evidence Municipality of Victoria v. CA, GR L-31189, 1987

 Municipality of Victoria v. CA, GR L-31189, 1987

Doctrine: Pursuant to the Best Evidence Rule, in lieu of a Deed of Sale evidencing the sale of a parcel of land, a certificate issued by the Archives Division of the Bureau of Records Management in Manila which shows, the nature of the instrument, the subject of the sale, the parties of the contract, the consideration, the names of the witness and the date of the sale is sufficient in proving the contents of the same Deed of Sale.

FACTS: A parcel of land owned by one Gonzalo Ditching deceased was inherited by his granddaughter Norma Leuenberger, herein private respondent.Thereafter Leuenberger discovered that a part of the land she inherited was being utilized by the Municipality of Victorias, herein petitioner, as a burial and cemetery ground.

This prompted Leuenberger to write to the Mayor of Victorias demanding the payment of past rentals and requesting the delivery of the parcel of land allegedly illegally occupied by Victorias. The Mayor replied that Victorias brought the land from Ditching but the Deed of Absolute Sale was lost. This prompted Leuenberger to file a complaint before the trial court for the recovery of possession of the parcel of land occupied by Victorias and was being utilized as a cemetery.

The trial court decided in favour of Victorias and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court and held that Victorias is liable for rentals and the return of the parcel of land. Now, Victorias assails the decision of the CA before the SC, it argues that a certificate in lieu of the DAS, and as secondary evidence, is admissible in evidence to prove the contents of the DAS which in turn evidences the sale of the parcel of land by Ditching in favour of Victorias, hence this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE CERTIFICATE ISSUED BY THE ARCHIVES DIVISION OF THE BUREAU OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT IN MANILA MAY BE ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE IN LIEU OF THE DAS PURSUANT TO THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE?

HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine* It is beyond question that the foregoing certificate is an authentic document clearly corroborated and supported by:

(a)     The testimony of the municipal councilor of Victorias, Ricardo Suarez, who negotiated the sale;

(b)     The testimony of Emilio Cuesta, the municipal treasurer of said municipality, since 1932 up to the date of trial on September 14, 1964, who personally paid the amount of P750.00 to Felipe Leuenberger as consideration of the Contract of Sale;

(c)     Certificate of Settlement "as evidence of said payment;"

(d)    Tax Declaration No. 429 which was cancelled and was substituted by Tax Declaration No. 3600 covering the portion of the property unsold; and

(e)     Tax Declaration No. 3601 in the name of the Municipal Government of Victorias covering the portion occupied as cemetery.

EVIDENCE Secondary Evidence Ebreo v. Ebreo, GR 160065, 28 February 2006

 Ebreo v. Ebreo, GR 160065, 28 February 2006

Doctrine: Under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original of a deed or document, the party has to prove with the requisite quantum of evidence, the loss or destruction or unavailability of all the copies of the original of said deed or document.

The annotation of the Deed of Sale in a tax declaration is not sufficient proof of the transfer of property.

FACTS: Felipe Ebreo died intestate in 1926, leaving behind as his heirs his 5 children, Gil, Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio and Felipa. He also left behind an untitled parcel of land in Barangay Sampaga, Batangas City, which, pursuant to the subdivision made by him, was subdivided into six lots, identified as Lots A, B, C, D, E and F.

On September 11, 1967, Felipe’s heirs executed and asigned a document entitled, “Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi ng Lupa,” whereby they extrajudicially partitioned the property, except the portion known as Lot No. 9046-F.

They agreed that said Lot F would remain under the co-ownership of Gil, Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio and the heirs of Felipa, who had already died. However, the plaintiffs were surprised to discover that Lot F was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Antonio Ebreo, Felino’s son.

The defendants alleged that, after the execution of the partition agreement, Lot F was sold by the heirs to Santiago Puyo, by virtue of which, the corresponding Real Property Tax Declaration was transferred in the latter’s name.

The lot was allegedly subsequently sold by Puyo to Antonio Ebreo, for which a new tax declaration was issued. However, the deed of sale evidencing the alleged transaction between the heirs and Puyo, which was claimed to have been executed and ratified in 1968 before Atty. Doroteo Chavez, was never presented.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS’ FAILURE TO PRESENT THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF THE LAND TO PUYO FATAL TO THEIR CLAIMS?

HELD: YES. The defendants claim that the Deed of Sale could not be presented because the copy on file with the Office of the City Assessor was lost in the fire which occurred in May 23, 1979. They presented the testimonies of Antonio Pajilan, an employee at the City Assessor’s Office, Felino Ebreo, and Asuncion Aguado, the stepdaughter of Santiago Puyo.

However, the testimonies are at most secondary evidence which are inadmissible considering that the defendants failed to prove any of the exceptions provided in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and to establish conditions for their admissibility.

Under this rule, before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original of a deed or document, the party has to prove with the requisite quantum of evidence, the loss or destruction or unavailability of all the copies of the original of said deed or document.

The offeror must prove:

a)       The execution and existence of the original;

b)      The loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and

c)       Unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the offeror.

The annotation of the Deed of Sale in a tax declaration is not sufficient proof of the transfer of property and inasmuch as the subject of inquiry is the Deed of Sale, it was incumbent on the defendants to adduce in evidence the original or a copy of the deed consistent with Sec. 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.