Apr 19, 2021

Suarez vs Emboy, Jr. 718 SCRA 677, CASE DIGEST – RULE 70 Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

 

Suarez vs Emboy, Jr. 718 SCRA 677, CASE DIGEST – RULE 70 Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

Varmencita Suarez vs. Mr. And Mrs. Felix Emboy, Jr. And Marilou Emboy-Delantar, G.R. No. 187944, March 12, 2014

REYES, J.:

Facts: A house occupied by the Emboys, stands in the subject lot. They claim that their mother had occupied the subject lot during her lifetime and it was earmarked to become her share. They had stayed in the subject lot for decades after inheriting the same from Claudia, who had in turn succeeded her own parents. Felix and Marilou Emboy were asked to vacate the subject lot and to transfer to another lot. They refused to comply insisting that Claudia’s inheritance. The Emboys received a demand letter from Suarez requiring them to vacate the subject lot. They were informed that Suarez had already purchased the subject lot. However, the Emboys did not heed the demand. Suarez filed before the MTCC a complaint for unlawful detainer.

MTCC: Upheld Suarez and the Emboys were ordered to vacate the subject lot. RTC affirmed MTCC. CA: Suarez’ complaint was neither one of forcible entry nor unlawful detainer but essentially involved an issue of ownership which must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria.

Issue: Whether or not Suarez’ complaint against the respondents had sufficiently alleged and proven a cause of action for unlawful detainer.

Conflicting Position:

Emboy: They have been occupying the subject lot in the concept of owners for several decades. That Suarez was a buyer in bad faith for having purchased the property despite the notice of lis pendens (petition for nullification of the partition) clearly annotated on the subject lot’s title. That the Heirs of Vicente, who had allegedly sold the subject lot to Suarez, had never physically occupied the same. Hence, there was no basis at all for Suarez’ claim that their possession of the subject lot was by mere tolerance of the alleged owners.

Suarez: She bought the subject lot from the registered owners thereof and the persons who allowed the Emboys to occupy the same by mere tolerance. As their successor-in-interest, she claimed her entitlement to possession of the subject lot and the right to demand to vacate the same.

Held: No. Suarez had not amply alleged and proven that all the requisites for unlawful detainer.

In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts must be alleged and sufficiently established:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

In the case at bar, the first requisite mentioned above is markedly absent. Suarez failed to clearly allege and prove how and when the respondents entered the subject lot and constructed a house upon it. Suarez was likewise silent about the details on who specifically permitted the respondents to occupy the lot, and how and when such tolerance came about. Instead, Suarez formulated a legal conclusion that (a) the respondents’ initial occupation of the subject lot was lawful by virtue of tolerance by the registered owners, and (b) the respondents became deforciants unlawfully withholding the subject lot’s possession after Suarez, as purchaser and new registered owner, had demanded for the former to vacate the property. It is worth noting that the absence of the first requisite assumes even more importance in the light of the Emboys’ claim that for decades, they have been occupying the subject lot as owners thereof.

The jurisdictional requirement of possession by mere tolerance of the owners had not been amply alleged and proven. Moreover, circumstances exist which justify the abatement of the ejectment proceedings. Suarez can ventilate her ownership claims in an action more suited for the purpose. The Emboys on other hand, need not be exposed to the risk of having their house demolished pending the resolution of their petition for nullification of the partition of the lot where ownership over the subject lot is likewise presented as an issue.

CA is affirmed.

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