Suarez vs Emboy, Jr. 718 SCRA 677, CASE
DIGEST – RULE 70 Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
Varmencita Suarez vs. Mr. And Mrs. Felix Emboy, Jr. And
Marilou Emboy-Delantar, G.R. No.
187944, March 12, 2014
REYES, J.:
Facts: A house occupied by the Emboys, stands in the
subject lot. They claim that their mother had occupied the subject lot during
her lifetime and it was earmarked to become her share. They had stayed in the
subject lot for decades after inheriting the same from Claudia, who had in turn
succeeded her own parents. Felix and Marilou Emboy were asked to vacate the
subject lot and to transfer to another lot. They refused to comply insisting
that Claudia’s inheritance. The Emboys received a demand letter from Suarez requiring
them to vacate the subject lot. They were informed that Suarez had already
purchased the subject lot. However, the Emboys did not heed the demand. Suarez
filed before the MTCC a complaint for unlawful detainer.
MTCC: Upheld Suarez and the Emboys were ordered to
vacate the subject lot. RTC affirmed MTCC. CA: Suarez’ complaint was neither
one of forcible entry nor unlawful detainer but essentially involved an issue
of ownership which must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria.
Issue: Whether or not Suarez’ complaint against the
respondents had sufficiently alleged and proven a cause of action for unlawful
detainer.
Conflicting Position:
Emboy: They have been occupying the subject lot in
the concept of owners for several decades. That Suarez was a buyer in bad faith
for having purchased the property despite the notice of lis pendens (petition
for nullification of the partition) clearly annotated on the subject lot’s
title. That the Heirs of Vicente, who had allegedly sold the subject lot to Suarez,
had never physically occupied the same. Hence, there was no basis at all for Suarez’
claim that their possession of the subject lot was by mere tolerance of the alleged
owners.
Suarez: She bought the subject lot from the
registered owners thereof and the persons who allowed the Emboys to occupy the
same by mere tolerance. As their successor-in-interest, she claimed her
entitlement to possession of the subject lot and the right to demand to vacate
the same.
Held: No. Suarez had not amply alleged and
proven that all the requisites for unlawful detainer.
In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following
key jurisdictional facts must be alleged and sufficiently established:
(1) initially, possession of property by the
defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon
notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of
possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession
of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant
to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
In the case at bar, the first requisite mentioned
above is markedly absent. Suarez failed to clearly allege and prove how and
when the respondents entered the subject lot and constructed a house upon
it. Suarez was likewise silent about the details on who specifically
permitted the respondents to occupy the lot, and how and when such tolerance
came about. Instead, Suarez formulated a legal conclusion that (a) the
respondents’ initial occupation of the subject lot was lawful by virtue of
tolerance by the registered owners, and (b) the respondents became deforciants
unlawfully withholding the subject lot’s possession after Suarez, as purchaser
and new registered owner, had demanded for the former to vacate the
property. It is worth noting that the absence of the first requisite
assumes even more importance in the light of the Emboys’ claim that for
decades, they have been occupying the subject lot as owners thereof.
The jurisdictional requirement of possession by mere
tolerance of the owners had not been amply alleged and proven. Moreover,
circumstances exist which justify the abatement of the ejectment proceedings. Suarez
can ventilate her ownership claims in an action more suited for the purpose.
The Emboys on other hand, need not be exposed to the risk of having their house
demolished pending the resolution of their petition for nullification of the
partition of the lot where ownership over the subject lot is likewise presented
as an issue.
CA is affirmed.