PEOPLE v. CCC, G.R. No. 228822, June 19, 2019, RULE 130, Sec. 53. Opinion of Ordinary witnesses.

 

RULE 130, Sec. 53. Opinion of Ordinary witnesses.

PEOPLE v. CCC, G.R. No. 228822, June 19, 2019

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS: CCC was charged with 4 informations on the crime of rape of his own daughter, AAA who is 12 years old at the time of the incident. BBB, the mother of AAA testified that AAA had a change of behavior, ran away from home, leaving behind a handwritten letter. BBB identified the handwritten letter of AAA in open court which AAA accuses her own father of being a "MANYAK" and that "7 Bises NIYA iYON GINAWA SA AKIN SIMULA NG NAMATAY SI LOLA." When BBB found AAA, she confronted her daughter as to why she ran away from home. AAA revealed that she had been raped by CCC 7 times, the first incident happening during the wake of BBB's mother.
AAA was able to testify, however, for lack of material time, her testimony was again suspended. There were multiple instances where BBB refused to sign the subpoena because AAA or BBB were outside of the locality.  Ultimately, AAA's testimony was expunged from the records due to the lack of cross-examination.

RTC found CCC guilty in all 4 counts of rape. The RTC found the testimony of BBB to be reliable and credible (BBB's testimony was never challenged or questioned by the defense). The testimony of BBB which was within her knowledge. Together with the testimony of Dr. Dianco finding that the hymen of AAA to be no longer intact which indicated possible penetration, and the undated letter of AAA which was positively identified by BBB in open court, the RTC found the evidence to be adequate and convincing to find CCC guilty. This was despite the fact that the RTC did not rely on AAA's testimony, which was expunged from the records due to the lack of cross-examination. RTC found that the failure of AAA to appear in court to continue her testimony - despite the issuance of several subpoenas - was because of lack of finances or poverty. CA affirmed the RTC. CA held that BBB was sufficiently familiar with her own daughter's penmanship, and she was able to identify the letter in open court. The letter clearly indicated that AAA was raped by her father even if the word "rape" was not used. Accusing her own father of being a "MANYAK" and "WALA KUNG KUWENT HIYANG AMA" clearly indicates that she had been raped - "7 Bises NiYA iYON GINAWA SA Akin SIMULA NG NAMATAY SI LOLA."

ISSUE: Whether or not BBB’s opinion in AAA’s change in behavior and handwritten letter is admissible in evidence.

HELD: YES. Rule 130, Sec. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. - The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding -
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.

The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person.

The letter was left by AAA when she ran away from home sometime after the alleged incidents, which began on the wake of BBB's mother as referred to by AAA in the letter. BBB herself testified that she noticed a change in behavior in AAA.

However, even is the testimony of BBB on AAA’s change of behavior and handwritten letter is admissible, it does not by itself prove the guilt of CCC. The handwritten letter of AAA does not prove that CCC indeed raped his daughter. AAA never explained what her father did to her. Characterizing her father as a "manyak" does not automatically mean that he raped her, as it may pertain to other acts which are lascivious that do not necessarily constitute rape. CCC IS ACQUITTED.

 

YAPYUCO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012, Rule 130. Sec. 31. Admission by conspirator

 

Rule 130. Sec. 31. Admission by conspirator

YAPYUCO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS: In a shooting incident, Licup was killed and Villanueva was injured while aboard a car, by all public officers, being then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) and while responding to information about the presence of armed NPA member in said barangay and conducting surveillance, thus committing the offense in relation to their office. Accused were Yapyuco, Jr., Cunanan, Jr. and Euno who were members of the Integrated National Police (INP) stationed at the Sindalan Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga; Pamintuan and Reyes, were barangay captains; Puno, Andres Reyes and Manguerra, David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu, Pabalan and David were either members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) or civilian volunteer. They were all charged with murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder in 3 Informations.

Yapyuco testified and admitted that all of them, including himself, were armed. But denied that they had committed an ambuscade because otherwise, all the occupants of the car would have been killed. He said that the shots which directly hit the passenger door of the jeepney did not come from him or from his fellow police officers but rather from Cafgu members, inasmuch as said shots were fired only when the jeepney had gone past the spot on the road where they were assembled.

Sandiganbayan found Yapyuco, Cunanan, Jr., Puno, Reyes, Reyes and Manguerra GUILTY of Homicide and attempted homicide as co-principals. There is no sufficient basis to rely fully on Pamintuan’s report that the victims were armed NPA members, and they have not been able by evidence to preclude ulterior motives or gross inexcusable negligence when they acted as they did.

ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession or admission of Yapyuco is admissible only against him and inadmissible against the other accused.

HELD: NO. Indeed, the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is admissible only against said accused, but is inadmissible against the other accused. But if the declarant or admitter repeats in court his extrajudicial admission, as Yapyuco did in this case, during the trial and the other accused is accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the admitter, the admission is admissible against both accused because then, it is transposed into a judicial admission.

It is thus perplexing why, despite the extrajudicial statements of Cunanan, Puno and Yapyuco, as well as the latter’s testimony implicating them in the incident, they still had chosen to waive their right to present evidence when, in fact, they could have shown detailed proof of their participation or non-participation in the offenses charged.  We, therefore, reject their claim that they had been denied due process in this regard, as they opted not to testify and be cross-examined by the prosecution as to the truthfulness in their affidavits and, accordingly, disprove the inculpatory admissions of their co-accused.

PEOPLE v. NIEVES CONSTANCIO G.R. No. 206226, April 04, 2016, RULE 130. Sec. 29. Admission by third party.

 

RULE 130. Sec. 29. Admission by third party.

PEOPLE v. NIEVES CONSTANCIO G.R. No. 206226, April 04, 2016

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS: "AAA" went to Alabang Town Center with her friends. After parting ways with them, "AAA" was about to board her car when she found herself confronted by Berry then armed with a knife, who was with Constancio, Pagkalinawan, Darden and "Burog." These five forcibly seized "AAA's" car and drove her to Constancio' house where she was raped and killed.

In an interview with ABS-CBN, Berry revealed that while "AAA's" car was parked in Constancio' garage, the said car was moving and shaking with "AAA" inside. This led him to suspect that something was already happening; that when the door of the car was opened, (Berry) saw that "AAA" was without her underwear; and that Constancio then uttered the words, "wala na," indicating that "AAA" was already dead. "AAA's" body was then placed inside the trunk of her car. Adarna, a tricycle driver, saw Berry, Constancio, and their other companions, throw something over a bridge which turned out to be "AAA's body upon investigation by the authorities.
Constancio et. Al were charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide

During the custodial investigation, Berry executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay and confessed that he did take part in the execution of the crime. At the trial, Berry denounced the Sinumpaang Salaysay as false, and claimed that he was coerced into signing the same. Both denied the charges against them. These two also asserted that Berry's extrajudicial confession was inadmissible in evidence.

RTC found Constancio and Berry guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide. RTC acquitted Pagkalinawan for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. CA affirmed the RTC. CA gave credence to Berry's extrajudicial confession as contained in the Sinumpaang Salaysay which he executed with the assistance of an attorney. Berry's extrajudicial confession was admitted as corroborative evidence of facts that likewise tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused and cousin, Constancio as shown by the circumstantial evidence extant in the records.
ISSUE: Whether or not Berry's confession is inadmissible in evidence against him under the principle of res inter alios acta found in Section 28.

HELD: No. Sec. 28, which provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,declaration, or omission of another. In Tamargo v. Awingan, the general rule is that an extra-judicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is inadmissible in evidence against his co-accused since it is considered hearsay against them. However, as an exception to this rule, an extra-judicial confession is admissible against a co-accused when it is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation of said co-accused in the crime. In order that an extra-judicial confession may be used against a co-accused of the confessant, "there must be a finding of other circumstantial evidence which when taken together with the confession would establish the guilt of a co-accused beyond reasonable doubt." Applying the rule to Constancio's case, the prosecution was able to show circumstantial evidence to implicate him in the crime. Berry's confession is admissible because it was voluntarily executed with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel in the person of Atty. Suarez. In point of fact Atty. Suarez testified that he thoroughly explained to Berry his constitutional rights and the consequences of any statements he would give. In default of proof that Atty. Suarez- was remiss in his duties, as in this case, this Court must hold that the custodial investigation of Berry was regularly conducted. For this reason, Berry's extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence against him.

Statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. In this case, there was no ample proof to show that Berry's narration of events to ABS-CBN was the product of intimidation or coercion, thus making the same admissible in evidence.

Harold Tamargo vs. Romulo Awingan, Lloyd Antiporda And Licerio Antiporda, Jr. G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010, RULE 130. Sec. 29. Admission by third party.

 

RULE 130. Sec. 29. Admission by third party.

Harold Tamargo vs. Romulo Awingan, Lloyd Antiporda And Licerio Antiporda, Jr. G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010

CORONA, J.:

FACTS: Atty. Tamargo and his daughter were shot and killed. The police had no leads until Geron executed an affidavit that Columna told him during a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by Antiporda and that he (Columna) was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo. That he told the Tamargo family what he knew and that the sketch of the suspect closely resembled Columna. Informations for murder were filed against Columna et. Al.

Columna executed an affidavit admitting his participation as "look out" during the shooting and implicated Awingan as the gunman and Antiporda, Jr. and his son, Antiporda as masterminds. The former was the ex-mayor and the latter the mayor of Buguey, Cagayan at that time. When the killing took place, Antiporda, Jr. was in detention for a kidnapping case in which Atty. Tamargo was acting as private prosecutor. Pursuant to this affidavit, Harold Tamargo (brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a complaint against those implicated by Columna. Awingan et. al denied any involvement in the killings. During the preliminary investigation, Columna disowned the contents of his affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession.  During the clarificatory hearing Columna admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter and denied that any violence had been employed to obtain or extract the affidavit from him. Thus, the city prosecutor dismissed of the charges. Meanwhile, Columna said that he was only forced to withdraw all his statements against Awingan et al. because of the threats to his life inside the jail. He requested that he be transferred to another detention center.

DOJ held that the extrajudicial confession of Columna was inadmissible and even if it was admissible, it was not corroborated by other evidence. RTC ruled that based on Columna’s affidavit, there was probable cause to hold the accused for trial. CA held Columna’s extrajudicial confession was not admissible because, aside from the recanted confession, there was no other piece of evidence presented to establish the existence of the conspiracy. The confession was made only after Columna was arrested and not while the conspirators were engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Columna’s extrajudicial confession was inadmissible against Awingan et. al because of the rule on res inter alios acta.

HELD: Yes. Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them. 

An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30: Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.

Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against Awingan et al, had no probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them.

Considering the inadmissibility of the evidence presented against the Awingan et al, it would be unfair to hold them for trial. Once it is ascertained that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused, they should be relieved from the pain of going through a full-blown court case. The evidence offered during the preliminary investigation is nothing more than an uncorroborated extrajudicial confession of an alleged conspirator, the criminal complaint should not prosper so that the system would be spared from the unnecessary expense of such useless and expensive litigation. The rule is all the more significant here since respondent Licerio Antiporda remains in detention for the murder charges pursuant to the warrant of arrest.

CA is affirmed.

 

Ayala Land, Inc. & Capitol Citifarms, Inc. v. Castillo et. Al, G.R. No. 178110, January 12, 2016, Rule 130. Sec. 27. Admission of a party.

 

Rule 130. Sec. 27. Admission of a party.

Ayala Land, Inc. & Capitol Citifarms, Inc. v.  Castillo et. Al, G.R. No. 178110, January 12, 2016

SERENO, C.J.

FACTS: Capitol Citifarms, Inc. (CCFI) undertook to obtain DAR approval for CARP exemption or conversion to non-agricultural use of a certain property. CCFI mortgaged the property to Manila Banking Corporation (MBC). MBC was awarded of the property in an auction sale. In a separate case, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas became a receiver, to sell the assets of MBC to Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) BSP requested in behalf of MBC for exemption of the subject property from CARL coverage which the DAR denied and directed the distribution of the land to qualified farmer beneficiaries. Thereafter, DAR deferred the proceeding with the distribution of lands already covered by CARL and CFI was granted the opportunity to present proof that the lands are qualified for exemption or conversion. MBC requested for DAR clearance to sell its landholdings placed under CARL coverage, which includes the subject property. DFA issued the conversion order.

Castillo et. Al (the tenant-farmers of the subjected land) contended that the Conversion Order should be revoked because the sale between CCFI and ALI was illegal and CCFI committed misrepresentation in its application for conversion. That the DAR Order enjoins the conversion of lands directly under a notice of acquisition.

CA held that when DAR had issued a Notice of Acquisition, which served as a perpetual ban on the conversion of the subject lands.

ISSUE: Whether or not letter-request of CCFI for the lifting of the Notice of Acquisition constituted an admission against interest of the fact that the notice was issued

HELD: No. There was no admissible proof presented to support Castillo’s claim that a Notice of Acquisition had been issued. What was attached was a mere photocopy of the Notice of Coverage. The purported Notice of Acquisition was never offered in evidence before the DAR and never became part of the records.

Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. - The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.

The above rule considers admissions against interest as admissible evidence, but does not dispense with the requirement that the admission be offered in evidence. In this case, precisely because Castillo did not raise the issue at all, ALI and CFFI did not have any opportunity to inspect or question the authenticity and due execution of the documents. It would be offensive to reverse the decisions of DAR and the Office of the President based on an alleged document - especially if that document has not been presented, authenticated, or offered in evidence — without giving the other party any opportunity to contradict the purported admission. CCFI and ALI, cannot be bound to whatever inference is being made only now on the purported CCFI letter requesting the lifting of the Notice of Acquisition.

Further, it must be noted that the letter does not identify the document itself, i.e., the Notice of Acquisition, as to date, as to signatory, as to amount tendered. It only asks that the Notice of Acquisition be lifted. It is probable, if this letter is genuine, that the alleged representative of CCFI was referring to the Notice of Coverage, which is an admitted fact, and is precisely the reason why the BSP had to ask for, and was granted, permission by this Court to sell the land.

AIR PHILIPPINES CO. vs. PENNSWELL, INC., G.R. No. 172835, December 13, 2007, RULE 130, SEC. 26. Privilege relating to trade secrets.

 

RULE 130, SEC. 26. Privilege relating to trade secrets.

AIR PHILIPPINES CO. vs. PENNSWELL, INC., G.R. No. 172835, December 13, 2007

P: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

FACTS: Pennswell delivered and sold to Air Ph sundry goods in trade. Air Ph failed to comply its obligation amounting to ₱449k. Pensswell filed a Complaint for a Sum of Money. Air Ph alleged that it was defrauded in the amount of ₱592k by Pennswell. Air Ph asserted that it was deceived by Pennswell which merely altered the names and labels of such goods.

RTC directed Pennswell to give Air Ph a detailed list of the ingredients or chemical components of the products. Pennswell contended that it cannot be compelled to disclose the chemical components sought because the matter is confidential and constituted a trade secret which they cannot be forced to divulge. RTC reversed itself and held that the chemical components are Pennswell’s trade secrets and are privileged in character. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Pennswell cannot be compelled to disclose the list of ingredients of their products as it is a trade secret and are privileged in character.

HELD: YES. To compel Pennswell to reveal in detail the list of ingredients of its lubricants is to disregard its rights over its trade secrets. The chemical formulation of the products and their ingredients are embraced within the meaning of "trade secrets."

A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to its owner and those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it.  The chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of Pennswell’s special lubricants are trade secrets within the contemplation of the law. The ingredients constitute the very fabric of Pennswell’s production and business. To compel its disclosure is to cripple Pennswell’s business, and to place it at an undue disadvantage.

In the case at bar, Air Ph cannot rely on the Consumer Act in order to compel Pennswell to reveal the chemical components of its products. While it is true that all consumer products domestically sold shall indicate their general make or active ingredients in their respective labels of packaging, the law does not apply to Pennswell. Its products are not consumer products and which are not intended for personal, family, household or agricultural purposes. Rather, they are for industrial use, specifically for the use of aircraft propellers and engines.

Indeed, the privilege is not absolute; the trial court may compel disclosure where it is indispensable for doing justice.

 

EMMA LEE vs. CA, G.R. No. 177861, July 13, 2010, RULE 130. SECTION 25. PARENTAL AND FILIAL PRIVILEGE

 

RULE 130. SECTION 25. PARENTAL AND FILIAL PRIVILEGE

EMMA LEE vs. CA, G.R. No. 177861, July 13, 2010

P: ABAD, J.:

Facts: Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) are immigrants from China. They had 11 children (the Lee-Keh children). Lee brought from China, Tiu Chuan (Tiu) to serve as housemaid. After Keh died, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu’s children with Lee (the Lee’s other children) claimed that they, too, were children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request NBI to investigate the matter. NBI concluded that the mother of the other 8 children (Lee’s other children) is most probably Tiu. Lee is in a dilemma in fixing the age of Keh to conform with his making his 8 children as their own legitimate children, elevating the status of his second family and secure their future. NBI found in the hospital records, the eldest of the Lee’s other children, Marcelo (who was recorded as the 12th child of Lee and Keh), was born of a 17-year-old mother, when Keh was already 38 years old at the time and so forth.

The Lee-Keh children filed for the deletion from the certificate of live birth of the Emma Lee, one of Lee’s other children, the name Keh and replace the same with the name Tiu to indicate her true mother’s name.

RTC granted the request of the Lee-Keh children to compel Tiu, Emma Lee’s presumed mother, to testify in the case. Tiu claimed that it violated Sec. 25, Rule 130, the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma’s stepmother. RTC thereafter quashed the subpoena it issued for being unreasonable and oppressive. CA held that Tiu’s advanced age alone does not render her incapable of testifying.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tiu can testify in court as it would violate her parental right not to be compelled to testify against her stepdaughter.

HELD: Yes. Tiu can Testify in court. Sec, 25. Parental and filial privilege. No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants.

But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother. Article 965 thus provides:

Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him. The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.

Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.

DFA vs. BCA INTERNATIONAL CO. G.R. No. 210858, June 29, 2016, Other privileged communication – RULE 130

 

Other privileged communication – RULE 130 -

DFA vs. BCA INTERNATIONAL CO. G.R. No. 210858, June 29, 2016

P: CARPIO, J.:

FACTS: DFA awarded the Machine Readable Passport and Visa Project (MRPN Project) to BCA International Corporation (BCA). During the implementation of the Project, DFA sought to terminate the Agreement. BCA opposed the termination and filed a Request for Arbitration. An ad hoc arbitral tribunal was constituted. The tribunal approved BCA's request to apply in court for the issuance of subpoena, subject to the conditions that the application will not affect its proceedings and the hearing will proceed whether the witnesses attend or not. BCA filed before the RTC a Petition for Assistance in Taking Evidence. BCA sought the issuance of subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum to the following witnesses and documents in their custody: Secretary of DFA, Secretary of Finance, Chairman of COA, Executive Director or any officer or representative of the DTI, DFA Undersecretary. DFA alleged that the presentation of the witnesses and documents was prohibited by law and protected by the deliberative process privilege.

RTC ruled in favor of BCA and held that the evidence sought to be produced was no longer covered by the deliberative process privilege. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority that acts, transactions or decisions are privileged only before a definite proposition is reached by the agency and since DFA already made a definite proposition and entered into a contract, DFA's acts, transactions or decisions were no longer privileged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acts, transactions or decisions are privileged only before a definite proposition is reached by the agency.

HELD: No. Chavez does not apply in this case. The constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order. In these exceptional cases, even the occurrence of a "definite proposition" will not give rise to the public's right to information. The privileged character of the information does not end when an agency has adopted a definite proposition or when a contract has been perfected or consummated; otherwise, the purpose of the privilege will be defeated.

"Deliberative process privilege contains three policy bases: first, the privilege protects candid discussions within an agency; second, it prevents public confusion from premature disclosure of agency opinions before the agency establishes final policy; and third, it protects the integrity of an agency's decision; the public should not judge officials based on information they considered prior to issuing their final decisions." 

The burden falls upon the government agency to prove that the information in question satisfies both requirements - predecisional and deliberative. It may be overcome upon a showing that the discoverant's interests in disclosure of the materials outweigh the government's interests in their confidentiality. "The determination of need must be made flexibly on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis," and the "factors relevant to this balancing include: the relevance of the evidence, whether there is reason to believe the documents may shed light on government misconduct, whether the information sought is available from other sources and can be obtained without compromising the government's deliberative processes, and the importance of the material to the discoverant's case."

The case is remanded back to RTC to determine whether the documents and records sought to be subpoenaed are protected by the deliberative process privilege as explained in this Decision.

Maximo Alvarez vs. Susan Ramirez, G.R. No. 143439 October 14, 2005, RULE 130. Sec. 23. Disqualification by reason of Marriage.

 

RULE 130. Sec. 23. Disqualification by reason of Marriage.

Maximo Alvarez vs. Susan Ramirez, G.R. No. 143439 October 14, 2005

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

FACTS: Maximo Alvarez set Susan Ramirez’ house on fire. Susan is Maximo’s sister-in-law. Maximo knew that when he set Susan’s house on fire, Susan and other members of her family including his sister, Esperanza (Maximo’s wife) was inside.

Susan Ramirez is the complaining witness in a criminal case for arson against Maximo pending before the RTC. The prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as the first witness against Maximo, her husband. Maximo and his counsel raised no objection. Esperanza testified that he saw his husband pouring gasoline outside Susan’s house.

In the course of Esperanza’s direct testimony, the latter showed "uncontrolled emotions," prompting the trial judge to suspend the proceedings.

Maximo filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification.

RTC disqualified Esperanza from further testifying and deleting her testimony from the records.  CA nullified and set aside RTC’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not Esperanza can testify against her husband in the criminal case.

HELD: YES. Sec. 22. Rule 130. Disqualification by reason of marriage. – During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants."

In Ordoño vs. Daquigan, when an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one against the other.

Obviously, the offense of arson by Maximo, directly impairs the conjugal relation between him and his wife. His act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed against him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.

As shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the relationship between Maximo and his wife was already strained. They were separated de facto almost 6 months before the incident. The evidence and facts presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage between them is no longer an interest the State aims to protect.

Esperanza is allowed to testify against her husband in the Arson case.

Jose Espineli vs. People G.R. No.179535, June 9, 2014, RULE 130, Sec. 22. Testimony confined to personal knowledge.

 

RULE 130, Sec. 22.  Testimony confined to personal knowledge.

Jose Espineli vs. People G.R. No.179535, June 9, 2014

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS: Alberto Berbon, a Senior Desk Coordinator of DZMM, was shot in front of his house by Jose Espineli (Jose), Paredes and 3 other unidentified persons who immediately fled the crime scene on board a waiting car. Reyes was arrested for another crime and  confided to the NBI that he was willing to give vital information regarding the Berbon case. NBI Agent Segunial interviewed Reyes where Reyes claimed that he saw Jose and Paredes board a red car while armed with a .45 caliber and armalite and that Jose told Paredes that "ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon."  The victim’s widow, Sabina Berbon (Sabina) likewise testified. According to her, Reyes sought financial help so he could transfer his family to the province and protect them from any untoward consequence that may result from his giving information. Another witness, Rodolfo Dayao (Rodolfo), testified that he sold his red Ford Escort car to the Paredes and 2 other person who came to his residence. He later identified the said car from the photographs presented to him by the PNP. Dr. Lagat, declared in Alberto’s Autopsy Report that the victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds and based on the size of the gunshot wounds or entrance, high-powered guns were used in the killing.

RTC found Jose guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder as charged. CA affirmed RTC. It ratiocinated that since none of the prosecution witnesses saw how the killing of the victim was perpetrated, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated. Neither can nighttime serve as an aggravating circumstance as the time of the commission of the crime was not even alleged in the Information. CA found petitioner guilty only of homicide instead of murder.

Jose anchors on the alleged erroneous admission in evidence of the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Reyes for being hearsay and inadmissible. That there was no direct evidence linking him to the crime. OSG representing People concurs with the Jose and recommends his acquittal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Reyes is a hearsay and therefore inadmissible.

HELD: No. Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. – A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.

Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when what is relevant is the fact that such statement has been made, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown. The statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or is circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact (Doctrine of independently relevant statements)

The testimony of NBI Agent Segunial of what Reyes confided to him, cannot be regarded as hearsay evidence. The agent’s testimony was not presented to prove the truth of such statement but only for the purpose of establishing that Reyes executed a sworn statement. What is relevant is the fact that Reyes made such statement and the truth and falsity thereof is immaterial. In such a case, the statement of the witness is admissible as evidence and the hearsay rule does not apply. 

DST MOVERS CO. vs. PEOPLE'S GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (PGIC), G.R. No.198627, January 13, 2016, RULE 130, Section 22. Testimony confined to personal knowledge.

 RULE 130, Section 22. Testimony confined to personal knowledge.

DST MOVERS CO. vs. PEOPLE'S GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (PGIC), G.R. No.198627, January 13, 2016

LEONEN, J.:

FACTS: A Honda Civic sedan owned by Fidel Yuboco was hit on the rear by an Isuzu Elf truck owned by DST Movers along the SLEX. PGIC underscored that the sedan was on a stop position when it was hit. The sedan was then allegedly pushed forward, hitting a Mitsubishi Lancer. The driver of the truck then allegedly escaped. The sedan was covered by PGIC’s insurance. As a result of the incident, the sedan’s owner filed a total loss claim with PGIC in the amount of P320k. PGIC paid. Asserting that it was subrogated to Yuboco’s rights and that the proximate cause of the mishap was the negligence of the driver of the truck, PGIC demanded from DST Movers the amount of P90k, which represented the difference between the P320k and the salvage price of P230k, at which PGIC was supposedly able to sell what remained of the sedan.  Its demands not having been satisfied, PGIC filed its Complaint for Sum of Money. In support of its recollection of the events, PGIC relied on a Traffic Accident Investigation Report (Report) prepared by PO2 Tomas of the Muntinlupa City Traffic Enforcement Unit of the PNP. DST Movers acknowledged that it was the owner of the truck. However, it claimed that the truck did not make any trips on that day as it was undergoing repairs and maintenance. DST Movers attached as copies of invoices, receipts, and cash vouchers relating to repairs and maintenance procedures that were undertaken on the truck on the day of the accident.

MTC found DST Movers liable. RTC and CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not DST Movers liability can be established based on the Traffic Accident Investigation Report

HELD: NO. Rule 130, Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. The Hearsay Rule, however, is not absolute. There are exceptions relevant to this case:  Sec. 44. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

This, however, is only true, for as long the following requisites have been satisfied: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.

Neither PO2 Tomas, nor the person who supposedly reported the events to PO2 Tomas gave a testimony in support of the Report. It was this person who reported and not PO2 Tomas, who had personal knowledge of the facts stated in the Report. Thus, even as the Report embodies entries made by a public officer in the performance of his duties, it fails to satisfy the third requisite for admissibility for entries in official records as an exception to the Hearsay Rule. To be admitted as evidence, it was thus imperative for PO2 Tomas to have himself presented as a witness and then testify on his Report. However, even as the Report would have been admitted as evidence, PO2 Tomas’ testimony would not have sufficed in establishing the identity of the motor vehicle and/or the person responsible for the damage sustained by the sedan. For this purpose, the testimony of G. Simbahon was necessary.

PEOPLE vs. NUÑEZ, G.R. No. 209342, OCTOBER 4, 2017, RULE 130, SECTION 21. Qualification of witnesses

 

RULE 130, SECTION 21. Qualification of witnesses.

PEOPLE vs. NUÑEZ, G.R. No. 209342, OCTOBER 4, 2017

LEONEN, J.:

FACTS: Nunez (allegedly Paul pobre), Marciales, Nabia and alias “Jun”, armed with handguns, rob Caltex gasoline station of 5k. They shoot and killed Regencia, Diaz and Dimatulac. Only Marciales and Nabia were tried at first. RTC found them guilty of robbery with homicide and sentenced them to death. The case against Pobre and Jun was archived subject to revival upon their apprehension. Nunez was apprehended by the PNP on the premise that he was the same ''Paul Pobre" identified in the Informaation. Nuñez moved that the case against him be dismissed as he was not the "Paul Pobre" charged in the Information. However, prosecution witnesses identified him as 1 of the alleged robbers. During trial, the prosecution adopted the evidence already presented in Marciales and Nabia's trial and recalled prosecution witnesses Cruz and Perez where they both positively identified Nunez as among the perpetrators of the crime. RTC found Nunez guilty of robbery with homicide. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Nuñez is the same person, earlier identified as Paul Pobre, who acted in conspiracy with Marciales and Nabia based on the testimony of the eye witnesses.

HELD: NO. The prosecution did not account for the details of the presentation of Nunez to the 2 witnesses after he was arrested. These witnesses' alleged positive identification occurred almost 8 and 9 years from the time of the commission of the offense.

A witness' credibility is ascertained by considering the first two factors, the witness' opportunity to view the malefactor at the time of the crime and the witness' degree of attention at that time, based on conditions of visibility and the extent of time, little and fleeting as it may have been, for the witness to be exposed to the perpetrators, peruse their features, and ascertain their identity.

The totality of circumstances test requires a consideration of the length of time between the crime and the identification made by the witness. Ideally a prosecution witness must identify the suspect immediately after the incident.

The identification made by Cruz and Perez is unreliable. Despite their identification, there remains reasonable doubt if Nuñez is the same Pobre who supposedly committed the robbery with homicide along with Marciales and Nabia. Cruz's admission that she could not identify the fourth robber anathemized any subsequent identification.

The witnesses failed to even give any prior description of him. A prosecution witness failed to exhibit even the slightest degree of certainty when originally given the chance to identify him as the supposed fourth robber. A significantly long amount of time had lapsed since the criminal incident; the original witness' statement that none of his features were seen as to enable his identification; and the positive identification made of him when the case was re-opened. His presentation for identification before and during trial was peculiarly, even worrisomely, suggestive as to practically induce in prosecution witnesses the belief that he, to the exclusion of any other person, must have been the supposed fourth robber.  Nunez is acquitted.

PEOPLE vs. SOTA and GADJADLI, G.R. No. 203121, November 29, 2017, RULE 130, SECTION 21. Qualification of witnesses.

 

RULE 130, SECTION 21. Qualification of witnesses.

PEOPLE vs. SOTA and GADJADLI, G.R. No. 203121, November 29, 2017

MARTIRES, J.:

FACTS: Sota, Gadjadli, close friends and neighbor of the victim, Artemio Eba (Artemio), demanded food from Artemio, Artemio was willing to comply but insisted that he would hand the food through an opening in the wall being afraid to open the door as he might be harmed. Sota and others started to burn Artemio’s house. Artemio’s daughter was able to escape the house.

The following day, Jocelyn, together with her brothers and sisters, found Artemio's body with stab and gunshot wounds. Jocelyn was brought to the police station where she executed her affidavit. The house was totally burned.  Sota and Gadjadli were charged with murder and arson. They pleaded not guilty. Prosecution called to the witness stand Jocelyn and Abelardo. Sota and Gadjadli contends that Jocelyn failed to elucidate who were the actual perpetrators and how the alleged crimes were carried out. They claimed that the tales of the events were all speculations and self-serving perceptions

RTC found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and Arson. CA found Jocelyn a credible witness who held her ground even during the cross-examination. That the requisites in order that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient for conviction had been satisfied in these cases and which proved beyond reasonable doubt that Sota and Gadjadli, together with three other unidentified individuals, killed Artemio and burned his house.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jocelyn is a credible witness

HELD: YES. Although Jocelyn was only 12 years old when the incident happened and when called to the witness stand, she possessed all the qualification and none of the disqualification to testify in these cases:

Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.

Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. -The following persons cannot be witnesses: (a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others; (b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.

Jocelyn's young age had no bearing on her qualification to testify on what happened. As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and can communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a witness. Significantly, even under the crucible of an intense cross-examination, Jocelyn never wavered in her narration as to the incidents that led to the killing of Artemio and the burning of their house, and in the affirmative identification of Sota and Gadjadli as two of the five persons who were responsible for these crimes.