YAPYUCO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012, Rule 130. Sec. 31. Admission by conspirator

 

Rule 130. Sec. 31. Admission by conspirator

YAPYUCO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS: In a shooting incident, Licup was killed and Villanueva was injured while aboard a car, by all public officers, being then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) and while responding to information about the presence of armed NPA member in said barangay and conducting surveillance, thus committing the offense in relation to their office. Accused were Yapyuco, Jr., Cunanan, Jr. and Euno who were members of the Integrated National Police (INP) stationed at the Sindalan Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga; Pamintuan and Reyes, were barangay captains; Puno, Andres Reyes and Manguerra, David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu, Pabalan and David were either members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) or civilian volunteer. They were all charged with murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder in 3 Informations.

Yapyuco testified and admitted that all of them, including himself, were armed. But denied that they had committed an ambuscade because otherwise, all the occupants of the car would have been killed. He said that the shots which directly hit the passenger door of the jeepney did not come from him or from his fellow police officers but rather from Cafgu members, inasmuch as said shots were fired only when the jeepney had gone past the spot on the road where they were assembled.

Sandiganbayan found Yapyuco, Cunanan, Jr., Puno, Reyes, Reyes and Manguerra GUILTY of Homicide and attempted homicide as co-principals. There is no sufficient basis to rely fully on Pamintuan’s report that the victims were armed NPA members, and they have not been able by evidence to preclude ulterior motives or gross inexcusable negligence when they acted as they did.

ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession or admission of Yapyuco is admissible only against him and inadmissible against the other accused.

HELD: NO. Indeed, the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is admissible only against said accused, but is inadmissible against the other accused. But if the declarant or admitter repeats in court his extrajudicial admission, as Yapyuco did in this case, during the trial and the other accused is accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the admitter, the admission is admissible against both accused because then, it is transposed into a judicial admission.

It is thus perplexing why, despite the extrajudicial statements of Cunanan, Puno and Yapyuco, as well as the latter’s testimony implicating them in the incident, they still had chosen to waive their right to present evidence when, in fact, they could have shown detailed proof of their participation or non-participation in the offenses charged.  We, therefore, reject their claim that they had been denied due process in this regard, as they opted not to testify and be cross-examined by the prosecution as to the truthfulness in their affidavits and, accordingly, disprove the inculpatory admissions of their co-accused.

PEOPLE v. NIEVES CONSTANCIO G.R. No. 206226, April 04, 2016, RULE 130. Sec. 29. Admission by third party.

 

RULE 130. Sec. 29. Admission by third party.

PEOPLE v. NIEVES CONSTANCIO G.R. No. 206226, April 04, 2016

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS: "AAA" went to Alabang Town Center with her friends. After parting ways with them, "AAA" was about to board her car when she found herself confronted by Berry then armed with a knife, who was with Constancio, Pagkalinawan, Darden and "Burog." These five forcibly seized "AAA's" car and drove her to Constancio' house where she was raped and killed.

In an interview with ABS-CBN, Berry revealed that while "AAA's" car was parked in Constancio' garage, the said car was moving and shaking with "AAA" inside. This led him to suspect that something was already happening; that when the door of the car was opened, (Berry) saw that "AAA" was without her underwear; and that Constancio then uttered the words, "wala na," indicating that "AAA" was already dead. "AAA's" body was then placed inside the trunk of her car. Adarna, a tricycle driver, saw Berry, Constancio, and their other companions, throw something over a bridge which turned out to be "AAA's body upon investigation by the authorities.
Constancio et. Al were charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide

During the custodial investigation, Berry executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay and confessed that he did take part in the execution of the crime. At the trial, Berry denounced the Sinumpaang Salaysay as false, and claimed that he was coerced into signing the same. Both denied the charges against them. These two also asserted that Berry's extrajudicial confession was inadmissible in evidence.

RTC found Constancio and Berry guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide. RTC acquitted Pagkalinawan for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. CA affirmed the RTC. CA gave credence to Berry's extrajudicial confession as contained in the Sinumpaang Salaysay which he executed with the assistance of an attorney. Berry's extrajudicial confession was admitted as corroborative evidence of facts that likewise tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused and cousin, Constancio as shown by the circumstantial evidence extant in the records.
ISSUE: Whether or not Berry's confession is inadmissible in evidence against him under the principle of res inter alios acta found in Section 28.

HELD: No. Sec. 28, which provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,declaration, or omission of another. In Tamargo v. Awingan, the general rule is that an extra-judicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is inadmissible in evidence against his co-accused since it is considered hearsay against them. However, as an exception to this rule, an extra-judicial confession is admissible against a co-accused when it is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation of said co-accused in the crime. In order that an extra-judicial confession may be used against a co-accused of the confessant, "there must be a finding of other circumstantial evidence which when taken together with the confession would establish the guilt of a co-accused beyond reasonable doubt." Applying the rule to Constancio's case, the prosecution was able to show circumstantial evidence to implicate him in the crime. Berry's confession is admissible because it was voluntarily executed with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel in the person of Atty. Suarez. In point of fact Atty. Suarez testified that he thoroughly explained to Berry his constitutional rights and the consequences of any statements he would give. In default of proof that Atty. Suarez- was remiss in his duties, as in this case, this Court must hold that the custodial investigation of Berry was regularly conducted. For this reason, Berry's extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence against him.

Statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. In this case, there was no ample proof to show that Berry's narration of events to ABS-CBN was the product of intimidation or coercion, thus making the same admissible in evidence.

Harold Tamargo vs. Romulo Awingan, Lloyd Antiporda And Licerio Antiporda, Jr. G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010, RULE 130. Sec. 29. Admission by third party.

 

RULE 130. Sec. 29. Admission by third party.

Harold Tamargo vs. Romulo Awingan, Lloyd Antiporda And Licerio Antiporda, Jr. G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010

CORONA, J.:

FACTS: Atty. Tamargo and his daughter were shot and killed. The police had no leads until Geron executed an affidavit that Columna told him during a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by Antiporda and that he (Columna) was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo. That he told the Tamargo family what he knew and that the sketch of the suspect closely resembled Columna. Informations for murder were filed against Columna et. Al.

Columna executed an affidavit admitting his participation as "look out" during the shooting and implicated Awingan as the gunman and Antiporda, Jr. and his son, Antiporda as masterminds. The former was the ex-mayor and the latter the mayor of Buguey, Cagayan at that time. When the killing took place, Antiporda, Jr. was in detention for a kidnapping case in which Atty. Tamargo was acting as private prosecutor. Pursuant to this affidavit, Harold Tamargo (brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a complaint against those implicated by Columna. Awingan et. al denied any involvement in the killings. During the preliminary investigation, Columna disowned the contents of his affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession.  During the clarificatory hearing Columna admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter and denied that any violence had been employed to obtain or extract the affidavit from him. Thus, the city prosecutor dismissed of the charges. Meanwhile, Columna said that he was only forced to withdraw all his statements against Awingan et al. because of the threats to his life inside the jail. He requested that he be transferred to another detention center.

DOJ held that the extrajudicial confession of Columna was inadmissible and even if it was admissible, it was not corroborated by other evidence. RTC ruled that based on Columna’s affidavit, there was probable cause to hold the accused for trial. CA held Columna’s extrajudicial confession was not admissible because, aside from the recanted confession, there was no other piece of evidence presented to establish the existence of the conspiracy. The confession was made only after Columna was arrested and not while the conspirators were engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Columna’s extrajudicial confession was inadmissible against Awingan et. al because of the rule on res inter alios acta.

HELD: Yes. Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them. 

An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30: Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.

Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against Awingan et al, had no probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them.

Considering the inadmissibility of the evidence presented against the Awingan et al, it would be unfair to hold them for trial. Once it is ascertained that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused, they should be relieved from the pain of going through a full-blown court case. The evidence offered during the preliminary investigation is nothing more than an uncorroborated extrajudicial confession of an alleged conspirator, the criminal complaint should not prosper so that the system would be spared from the unnecessary expense of such useless and expensive litigation. The rule is all the more significant here since respondent Licerio Antiporda remains in detention for the murder charges pursuant to the warrant of arrest.

CA is affirmed.

 

Ayala Land, Inc. & Capitol Citifarms, Inc. v. Castillo et. Al, G.R. No. 178110, January 12, 2016, Rule 130. Sec. 27. Admission of a party.

 

Rule 130. Sec. 27. Admission of a party.

Ayala Land, Inc. & Capitol Citifarms, Inc. v.  Castillo et. Al, G.R. No. 178110, January 12, 2016

SERENO, C.J.

FACTS: Capitol Citifarms, Inc. (CCFI) undertook to obtain DAR approval for CARP exemption or conversion to non-agricultural use of a certain property. CCFI mortgaged the property to Manila Banking Corporation (MBC). MBC was awarded of the property in an auction sale. In a separate case, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas became a receiver, to sell the assets of MBC to Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) BSP requested in behalf of MBC for exemption of the subject property from CARL coverage which the DAR denied and directed the distribution of the land to qualified farmer beneficiaries. Thereafter, DAR deferred the proceeding with the distribution of lands already covered by CARL and CFI was granted the opportunity to present proof that the lands are qualified for exemption or conversion. MBC requested for DAR clearance to sell its landholdings placed under CARL coverage, which includes the subject property. DFA issued the conversion order.

Castillo et. Al (the tenant-farmers of the subjected land) contended that the Conversion Order should be revoked because the sale between CCFI and ALI was illegal and CCFI committed misrepresentation in its application for conversion. That the DAR Order enjoins the conversion of lands directly under a notice of acquisition.

CA held that when DAR had issued a Notice of Acquisition, which served as a perpetual ban on the conversion of the subject lands.

ISSUE: Whether or not letter-request of CCFI for the lifting of the Notice of Acquisition constituted an admission against interest of the fact that the notice was issued

HELD: No. There was no admissible proof presented to support Castillo’s claim that a Notice of Acquisition had been issued. What was attached was a mere photocopy of the Notice of Coverage. The purported Notice of Acquisition was never offered in evidence before the DAR and never became part of the records.

Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. - The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.

The above rule considers admissions against interest as admissible evidence, but does not dispense with the requirement that the admission be offered in evidence. In this case, precisely because Castillo did not raise the issue at all, ALI and CFFI did not have any opportunity to inspect or question the authenticity and due execution of the documents. It would be offensive to reverse the decisions of DAR and the Office of the President based on an alleged document - especially if that document has not been presented, authenticated, or offered in evidence — without giving the other party any opportunity to contradict the purported admission. CCFI and ALI, cannot be bound to whatever inference is being made only now on the purported CCFI letter requesting the lifting of the Notice of Acquisition.

Further, it must be noted that the letter does not identify the document itself, i.e., the Notice of Acquisition, as to date, as to signatory, as to amount tendered. It only asks that the Notice of Acquisition be lifted. It is probable, if this letter is genuine, that the alleged representative of CCFI was referring to the Notice of Coverage, which is an admitted fact, and is precisely the reason why the BSP had to ask for, and was granted, permission by this Court to sell the land.